ThisisanopenaccesstitleavailableunderthetermsofaCCBY-NC-ND4.0Internationallicence.ItisfreetoreadatOxfordScholarshipOnlineandofferedasafreePDFdownloadfromOUPandselectedopenaccesslocations.ChristopherS.Hillarguesthatperceptualexperienceconstitutivelyinvolvesrepresentationsofworldlyitems,andthattherelevantformofrepresentationcanbeexplainedinbroadlybiologicalterms.Hethenmaintainsthattherepresentationalcontentsofperceptualexperiencesareperceptualappearances,interpretedasrelational,viewpoint-dependentpropertiesofexternalobjects.Thereisalsoacomplementaryexplanationofhowtheobjectsthatpossessthesepropertiesarerepresented.Hillmaintainsthatperceptualphenomenologycanbeexplainedreductivelyintermsoftherepresentationalcontentsofexperiences,andusesthisdoctrinetoundercutthetraditionalargumentsfordualism.Thistreatmentofperceptualphenomenologyisexpandedtoencompasscognitivephenomenology,thephenomenologyofmoodsandemotions,andthephenomenologyofpain.Hillalsooffersaccountsofthevariousformsofconsciousnessthatperceptualexperiencescanpossess.Oneaimistoarguethatphenomenologyismetaphysicallyindependentoftheseformsofconsciousness,andanotheristode-mystifytheformknownasphenomenalconsciousness.Thebookconcludesbydiscussingtherelationsofvariouskindsthatperceptualexperiencesbeartohigher-levelcognitivestates,includingrelationsofformat,content,andjustificationorsupport.
